School Personnel and Employment Law: A Legal Analysis for Today’s Elementary and Secondary Catholic School by Guite, David K
Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry
and Practice
Volume 4 | Issue 4 Article 3
6-1-2001
School Personnel and Employment Law: A Legal
Analysis for Today’s Elementary and Secondary
Catholic School
David K. Guite
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ce
This Focus Section Article is brought to you for free with open access by the School of Education at Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for publication in Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice by the journal's editorial board
and has been published on the web by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For
more information about Digital Commons, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. To contact the editorial board of Catholic Education: A Journal
of Inquiry and Practice, please email CatholicEdJournal@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guite, D. K. (2001). School Personnel and Employment Law: A Legal Analysis for Today’s Elementary and Secondary Catholic School.
Journal of Catholic Education, 4 (4). http://dx.doi.org/10.15365/joce.0404062013
SCHOOL PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW: A LEGAL ANALYSIS FOR
TODAY'S ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
CATHOLIC SCHOOLS
DAVID K. GUITE
St. Perpetua School
Diocesan central ojfice staff, principals, pastors, and other chief executive
officers face personnel and hiring decisions regularly. Dismissal of employ-
ees and nonrenewal of contracts often result in protracted litigation. This
article reviews recent case law in a variety of employment issues, including
dismissal or firing of contracted employees, nonrenewal of contracts, racial
discrimination, age discrimination, disability discrimination, sex or gender
discrimination, sexual harassment, and the right of workers to organize. The
author concludes with an appeal to Catholic leaders to stay well informed
of ongoing developments in employment taw and calls for the implementa-
tion of arbitration to avoid costly litigation.
During the past 60 years, an enormous change has taken place in the lawof the workplace and personnel. Between 1935 and 1965, the only major
employment law was the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Enacted in
1935 and amended in 1947 and 1959, the NLRA focused on the rights of
employees to organize into unions and to bargain collectively. By the early
1960s, however, it had become clear that providing individuals with the right
to organize and bargain collectively could not address all personnel problems.
Various legal manifestations for protecting workers from unjust treatment
came to fruition. Most federal labor laws are contained in four major
Congressional Acts: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1967, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970). Each of these historic,
national employment initiatives has been amended by supplementary statutes
bearing distinctive titles and purposes, such as the Americans With
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Disabilities Act of 1990, the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, or separate legislation, such as the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. How are our Catholic elementary and
secondary schools affected by these laws? The following discussion will
review how Catholic elementary and secondary schools walk the narrow line
between religious freedom and legal responsibilities to their employees.
CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
The role of government in the regulation of employment within the Catholic
school is pervasive. It runs the gamut from reporting, withholding, and pay-
ment of taxes to governmental labor regulations and employee benefit laws,
and premiums for governmentally sponsored initiatives under threat of severe
penalties including loss of tax-exempt status. The extent of today's regulato-
ry activity by federal and state governments makes conflict almost inevitable.
Religious schools, whether they are legally a part of a local church con-
gregation, separately incorporated and autonomous, or part of an educational
organization of a larger church association or diocese, are private organiza-
tions. While it is clear that they perform a public benefit in fulfilling a secu-
lar educational task and they may receive federal or state aid in the operation
of that task, the schools themselves are private, not public, agencies. Yet, in
the law of labor and employment and personnel, religious schools relegate
these private privileges. The National Labor Relations Board, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), federal and state
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and state Industrial
Relations Commissions do not hesitate to investigate and enforce their regu-
lations in what they long ago decided were the "secular" activities of reli-
gious organizations (Bassett, 1997).
Some legislation provides express exemptions for Catholic Church insti-
tutions, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Section 702, which
exempts religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition of religious dis-
crimination in employment. Catholic schools are included under the coverage
of some but not all of the above-referenced employment legislation. To
understand the impact of government upon the administration of religious
schools, one must recognize the constitutional issues of free exercise and
entanglement in church affairs under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly interpreted the First Amendment in
Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) and Everson v. Board of Education (1947) to
mean that government may not hinder or burden the free exercise of religion
without a strong, indeed compelling, nonreligious motive and government
may not aid religion unless, among other things, the purpose and primary
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effect of the aid are secular.
Catholic churches and religiously affiliated organizations like Catholic
schools are unique institutions in the United States. They operate in some
ways like trusts, unincorporated associations, or nonprofit corporations, but
in other ways they are quite different. The religious nature of these institu-
tions causes some states to recognize the difference aud to designate special
incorporating statutes for religious societies, as California does in its
Corporation Code Sections 9110-9690.
The relationships between individual employees within the Catholic
school structure are similarly unique. Discernment of the boundaries between
public authority in employment and religious freedom and Church rules for
the school itself is very difficult. The Church school is regulated by two
entirely different systems of law: the civil law, cognizable by the secular
courts to the extent that civil law affects relevant activity; and the internal
religious rules, the Code of Canon Law (Canon Law Society, 1983), based on
belief and tradition that lie beyond the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Regarding issues such as employment contracts for hiring and discharge of
Catholic school employees, the question of whether such employment relates
to doctrinal matters or matters essentially of internal discipline is more prob-
lematic than such actions taken in connection with those who administer the
Catholic doctrine. All Catholic schools are subject to the bishop in matters of
faith and in all other matters prescribed by the Code of Canon Law
(Shaughnessy, 1991). Thus, school employees are bound to their bishop and
Canon law in their employment relationships with the school. Yet, civil courts
will not allow religious institutions to evade legal responsibilities by invok-
ing church law. It is a difficult balancing act.
When it comes to issues of governmentally regulated labor-management
relations in churches and religious institutions, an "on-the-one-hand versus
on-the-other-hand" rationale arises. Catholic schools are the manifold expres-
sions of religion privileged under the U.S. Constitution. If exemption from
state employment laws is made for the churches, that is a benefit that can be
construed by way of assistance or subsidy of religion, which brings into play
the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, the regulation
and control of employment decisions implied in union recognition and
antidiscrimination laws can be a severe burden put upon churches' freedom
to manage their internal affairs autonomously.
Government involvement in the employment practices and policies of
religious institutions occurs on two levels. It precedes and accompanies
employment decisions with a dossier of federal and state statutes enforced by
reporting, compliance, and fmancial penalties. It also follows the employ-
ment relationship into civil courts on the issues of wrongful terminations,
unfair practices, or employment discrimination based on either contract or
tort claims. A wrongful termination case grounded in claims of sexual dis-
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crimination, for example, can involve concurrent federal and state jurisdic-
tions and end in a verdict of damages that are financially devastating for the
church school.
Specific involvement of schools in employment law ranges from dis-
charge cases, alleging breach of contract, wrongful discharge or discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, religion, age, national origin, pregnancy, sexu-
al orientation or marital status, to damages for sexual harassment or retalia-
tion. It may involve equal pay and benefit cases. Fair Labor Standards prac-
tices, collective bargaining, and the role of unions and federal or state
employment agencies. In the area of employment law, the sphere of church
autonomy is diminishing. Generally, courts will take jurisdiction where doc-
trine is not at stake. The realm of protection from judicial scrutiny is only
what is required by faith and the discipline of faith (Bassett, 1997).
As civil courts debate the involvement of government in Catholic school
employment questions. Catholic schools themselves should balance Church
teachings on labor-management relations as stated in "The Canonical
Standards in Labor-Management Relations" (1987) with the employment of
school personnel.
The Catholic Church has a long tradition of seeking justice for workers.
In 1891, Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum Novarum, in which he provided guide-
lines for equity in bargaining and exchange. In the 1931 encyclical
Quadragesimo Anno, Pope Pius XI supported Pope Leo's defense of worker
rights. Pope John XXIII in 1961 wrote Mater et Magistra, supporting work-
ers' rights to full participation in industry decision-making. In other Church
documents, including the Vatican Council II document Gaudium et Spes
(1966b) and Pope Paul VI's encyclicals Populoium Progressio (1967) and
Octagesima Adveniens (1971), human rights and the dignity of human per-
sons are systematically defined for all levels of society. Pope John Paul II's
1979 encyclical Redeniptor Hominis urges all people to work for justice in
labor practices. The Second Vatican Council directly affirmed the basic
equality of all persons since all are created in God's likeness; it concluded
that every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural, whether based
on sex, race, color, social condition, language, or religion, must be overcome
and eradicated as contrary to God's intent.
When Catholic school personnel issues arise, they do not neatly catego-
rize themselves as clearly legal or illegal, right or wrong. When issues are
juxtaposed against government statutes, regulations, public policies, and our
own Catholic mission. Catholic schools can be lacking a clear avenue to trav-
el. Implementation is a more complex process, one which demands the exer-
cise of prudence and a sense of the Church's role of proclaiming and model-
ing the Kingdom of God in this world.
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DISMISSAL AND NONRENEWAL
OE CONTRACTS
Most cases involving Catholic school personnel, specifically elementary and
secondary teachers, deal with teacher dismissals or the nonrenewal of
employment contracts (Shaughnessy, 1991). Employment contracts are gen-
erally enforced on their terms. If there is a breach, it is remedied by standard
compensatory damages. Although Constitutional protections such as due
process are afforded public school teachers but not granted to Catholic school
teachers, both sets of teachers are protected by contract law.
Wrongful termination occurs without just cause before completion of the
task or before the contracted service period has been completed. Wrongful
discharge is generally a breach of contract, while an illegal discharge is a vio-
lation of the law based upon discriminatory motive or for an illegal purpose,
such as retaliation for filing an unfair labor practice complaint. Note that
wrongful termination occurs during the running of an employment contract.
It is clearly distinguishable from a failure to renew a contract, the renewal of
which may or may not be subject to contract law.
When the school discharges an employee, the employee may bring suit.
A court will analyze the terms of the employment contract and consider the
nature of the work or activity for the employment. If the activity is "religious"
and termination was based on religious motives, such as expressed belief or
conduct inconsistent with the church's own faith or ethical norms, in most
cases the decision of the church school has been upheld. Relevant cases are
Christine Madsen v. Robert Erwin (1985), which involved a lesbian writer for
the Christian Science Monitor, and O'Connor Hospital v. Superior Court
(1987), which involved a priest who was a chaplain at a Catholic hospital.
The First Amendment deference rules ordinarily disallow courts from
scrutinizing a church's religious judgments in breach of contract actions
involving ministers and persons employed for religious roles in the church. In
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dciv
Saints v. Amos (1987), Justice Brennan wrote in the Supreme Court concur-
ring opinion that the courts should not second-guess the church's qualifying
judgment by attempting to decide, against the church's judgment, what is and
what is not a "religious" or "similar" activity.
Closely allied to the ministerial exemption is employment of a teacher
within an elementary or secondary school associated with a church. Here the
position may be determined not only on the basis of adherence to the religion
of the sponsoring church but also conduct consistent with its teachings.
Because the faculty and staff in church-related schools serve a pervasively
religious pedagogical and exemplary role, their job description is always at
least partially doctrinal, and their service in the schools is central to the min-
istry of the church (Bassett, 1997).
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Supreme Court reiterated the religious
nature of parochial primary and secondary schools: "religious authority nec-
essarily pervades the school system" (p. 602). Religious schools are a vital
part of the mission and ministry of the churches that operate them. The
schools are not only academic; they provide what the public schools cannot,
namely, instruction in academic and scientific knowledge and skills along
with the teaching of religious doctrine and discipline in an atmosphere of reli-
gious values. As such, appointment to any and all staff positions in religious
primary and secondary schools bears closely upon the intimate relationship
between a church and its ministerial or religious mission. The courts should
not second-guess the essentially religious decisions made upon the qualifica-
tions of any teacher or staff member of a parochial school.
Case law, on constitutional grounds, runs toward a generally hands-off
stance where religious preferences are exercised even in institutions that are
semi-independent and for curricular and staff positions not directly aimed
toward the propagation of a particular religion. In Little v. Wuerl (1990), the
Third Circuit upheld a Catholic school's decision not to retain a teacher who
had remarried contrary to the canon law of the Catholic Church. The court
believed the decision for nonrenewal of her contract was based upon internal
Church discipline within the context of a religious school, and thus, was priv-
ileged.
A Montana case similar to Little (1990) was Miller v. Catholic Diocese
of Great Falls (1986), in which the court dismissed a wrongful discharge suit
of a parochial school teacher on Eirst Amendment grounds. The court would
not entertain a wrongful discharge suit brought by a former lay teacher in a
parochial school, discharged, according to the diocese, for inadequate disci-
plining of her students. The court viewed the teacher's disciplinary methods
as important to the religious purpose of the school.
In Larsen v. Kirkham (1980/1983), a Mormon business school deter-
mined that a Mormon teacher was not sufficiently involved in ecclesiastical
activities and discharged her. The District Court held that her religious dis-
crimination claim was barred by Section 703(e), the religious exemption
clause in Title VII, and that this exemption did not violate the Establishment
Clause. The Mormon Church was permitted to discriminate on religious
grounds among its own members without violating Title VII.
In Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. (1994), an
Illinois court of appeals refused to distinguish a contract obligation of a
rescinded offer for a parochial kindergarten teaching position from the under-
lying ecclesiastical decision made by the Church on the qualifications of a
parochial school teacher and dismissed the suit.
When the Archdiocese of Newark decided to replace a parochial school
principal, the First Amendment protections of the Church won over a breach
of contract complaint in Sabatino v. St. Aloysiits Parish (1996). In this case
David K. Guite/SCHOOL PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 499
the archdiocese had decided to reorganize its parochial school system and
close two schools. The plaintiff had been principal of one of the schools that
were closed. The court of appeals held that a principal performs a ministeri-
al religious role in a school. The Church's choice of a nun instead of a lay-
woman to promote its religious mission was protected by the First
Amendment.
A case involving a lawsuit by a Protestant teacher against the Catholic
Diocese of Kalamazoo, Perth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo
(1995), was filed when her teaching contract was not renewed. The trial court
issued a judgment for the diocese, confirming that the decision not to renew
Porth's contract was based on her religious faith because the diocese had
decided that year to hire a Catholic-only faculty. The court held that if the
school were forced to hire non-CathoHc teachers, the burden would constitute
an unacceptable interference with religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.
Catholic schools must recognize that courts can and do decide that reli-
gious employment contracts are for an activity entirely secular in nature,
thereby subjecting the churches to liability for illegal terminations based on
religious discrimination. Despite Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich (1976), in which the Supreme Court articulated the notion that
religious ministerial hirings are thought to be "religious in nature," some
courts have held in the contrary, indicating that the First Amendment's pro-
tection in religious employment matters is not absolute.
In Reardon v. LeMoyne (1982), an often-cited New Hampshire case
involving four women religious in conflict with the diocesan office, an
appeals court found that the doctrine of separation of church and state did not
preclude jurisdiction in nondoctrinal contract matters. The court wrote:
Religious entities, however, are not totally immune from responsibility
under civil law. In religious controversies involving property or contractual
rights outside the doctrinal realm, a court may accept jurisdiction and render
a decision without violating the first amendment.... It is clear from the fore-
going discussion that civil courts are permitted to consider the validity of
non-doctrinal contractual claims which are raised by parties to contracts
with religious entities. This requires the courts to evaluate the pertinent coti-
tractual provisions and intrinsic evidence to determine whether any viola-
tions of the contract have occurred, and lo order appropriate remedies, if
necessary, (pp. 431-432)
In Reardon {1982), the employment contracts specified terms of employ-
ment including compensation, employee duties and responsibilities, rules
regulating dismissal and rights of appeal, and rules for contract modification.
The sisters alleged breach of contract due to their contractual right to a hear-
ing prior to dismissal or termination. The school argued that nonrenewal did
500 Catholic Edticalioij/]une 2001
not require the hearing procedure.
On appeal, the diocesan authorities urged the New Hampshire Supreme
Court to apply the deference rule and deny jurisdiction. Instead, the state
Supreme Court adopted the neutral principles approach and ordered the trial
court to extend jurisdiction over all parties. The court concluded that it would
be "unfair and illogical" to deny the sisters access to the civil courts on non-
doctrinal matters when they voluntarily entered into civil contracts.
The court authorized the trial court to construe the language of the con-
tract on the meaning of dismissal and nonrenewal according to the ordinary
principles of contract law, including "extrinsic evidence of dismissal prac-
tices at the Sacred Heart School and elsewhere within the diocese" (Reardon,
1982, p. 433). It empowered the trial court to rule on the sufficiency of "any
secular reasons for nonrenewal or dismissal" but warned that contractual
grounds involving doctrinal judgments were "beyond the judicial sphere of
authority." The court concluded:
While we recognize the difficulty of the trial court's task, we believe that
this task can be facilitated by keeping in mind the distinction between non-
doctrinal matters, wherein jurisdiction lies, and matters involving doctrine,
faith, or internal organization which are insulated from judicial inquiry.
{Reardon, 1982, p. 433)
The Reardon (1982) court chose to apply neutral principles of contract
law to resolve the case, although, consistent with the Supreme Court's stric-
tures, it warned against extensive inquiry into internal church affairs. In
Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop (1990), a California Court of Appeals
completely avoided the religious deference rule to construe a written, termi-
nal contract on its own terms, affirming summary judgment against the plain-
tiffs who filed an action for wrongful termination from a Catholic high
school. The court did not note the religious affiliation of the school or the
specifically religious nature of the assistant principal's role in it.
In Hajny v. Church of Saints Peter and Paul (1994), two teachers sued the
church for wrongful termination and defamation of character. The teachers
had served the church's school on one-year contracts since the 1970s. When
asked the reasons for their termination, the pastor indicated poor attitudes and
insubordination. Subsequently, the pastor offered similar explanations to
parishioners who inquired about the discharge. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals dismissed the wrongful termination charge on a finding that the
parish had followed Archdiocesan policies, so no breach of contract occurred.
The court allowed the defamation action to go forward, however, finding the
pastor was not privileged to make the defamatory statements. The point here
is the court decided strictly on contract grounds, using the contract itself and
incorporating the terms of the express church policies.
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It appears that in today's civil courts a judge will decide the terms of a
written church-school employment contract on grounds of "neutral princi-
ples."
In Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fishman (1987), the New Jersey
Superior Court stated:
Courts do not necessarily refrain from jurisdiction in every case where a
church or synagogue and its ministers, rabbis or congregation may be
involved in a dispute, because not every application to the court involves
protected First Amendment rights or values, (p. 417)
The court cited Supreme Court case Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hail Memorial Presbyterian Church (1969), and went on to state that
while it shouldn't interfere in matters of faith, dogma, and polity, it could
resolve civil disputes provided a justifiable controversy is present. Elmora
(1987) was a case in which a board of trustees of a temple sought to discharge
its rabbi. Of great significance is the New Jersey statement of a methodology
for the trial courts to handle conflicts of this nature:
It is imperative, in order to avoid unconstitutional entanglements of civil and
religious issues and to preserve the right to civil adjudication of secular dis-
putes, for a trial court to specify which issues are religious and therefore to
be settled by religious authority and which issues are civil and to be resolved
by the court. For example, only a religious authority may be able to decide
the scope of duties of an "orthodox Rabbi"; but a civil court can certainly
determine the term of a contract or non-religious conditions of employment.
Thus, when faced with cases such as this, trial courts initially should enter-
tain full briefing and argument by the parties as to what issues are "reli-
gious" and what are "civil"; and as to what is the proper authority to decide
"religious" questions. By providing complete and clear rulings on such
questions before referral to any religious tribunal, a trial court will provide
the parties and appellate courts with a clear record for informed review of
any possible first amendment issues. {Elmora, 1987, p. 419)
In Welter v. Seton Hall University (1992), two Catholic nuns were dis-
missed by Seton Hall University where they were professors and administra-
tors. They sued for various torts and for wrongful termination. The trial judge
dismissed Seton Hall's motion for summary judgment grounded in the First
Amendment. The judge found that there was no action against Seton Hall by
the Roman Catholic Church or its tribunals, but rather, it was an action by an
educational institution to remove its teachers, and the issue did not constitute
a religious question, despite the University contention that the terminations
were religiously motivated. Seton Hall admitted it had failed to abide by the
employment contract's provision governing termination. The New Jersey
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Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division who reversed the trial court,
and held the plaintiffs performed non-ministerial functions as mathematics
teachers and thus there was no incorporation of Roman Catholic doctrine
even though the plaintiffs were nuns and employed by a college run by the
Newark Archdiocese.
After Welter (1992), the New Jersey Supreme Court in Alicia v. New
Bfunswick Theological Seminary (1992) did fmd a clear ministerial function
in a theology professor's teaching assignment in a seminary, so deferred to
the Church's decision to terminate employment.
One can see that civil courts will scrutinize Catholic school employment
contracts to ensure that the provisions of the contract have been followed.
While a Catholic school employment contract may be far less involved than
a public school contract, it is nonetheless an employment contract reviewed
by civil courts of law.
In turn. Catholic educators must be familiar with all federal employment
laws and regulations and respective state laws governing the workplace.
These laws can guide in developing diocesan and school policies.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, pro-
hibits employment discrimination on account of race, color, religion, gender,
and national origin.
Antidiscrimination law involves shared federal and state jurisdiction.
Overiapping statutes create overlapping jurisdictions. However, in Title VII,
Section 706, the federal law provides that the federal EEOC defer to a state
antidiscrimination agency if the state agency wants to take jurisdiction. The
objectives of most state and municipal antidiscrimination statutes are the
same as Title VII.
Religious institutions such as churches, conventions, and associations of
churches are exempt from Title VII Sections 702 and 703 for religious pref-
erences. Catholic schools can discriminate on the basis of religion, and
Catholic teachers can be given preference in hiring. However, Catholic
schools cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, gender, national ori-
gin, age, or disability. There are no exemptions from discrimination for these
classifications. Federal antidiscrimination legislation can affect Catholic
schools because the government has a compelling interest in the equal treat-
ment of all citizens.
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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The limited exemption of churches and religious organizations found in
Section 702 is not available against a charge of racial discrimination. As a
result, a number of cases alleging racial discrimination have been brought
against religious schools, not only under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but
also under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Supreme Court has described as "compelling" the government's
interest in the elimination of racial discrimination in education. In Bob Jones
University v. United States (1983), the Supreme Court upheld a decision by
the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax-exempt status to a private, nonprof-
it school engaged in racially discriminatory practices in relation to its student
body. It stated:
The government interest at stake here is compelling. As discussed, the
Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial dis-
crimination in education...that governmental interest substantially out-
weighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on the school's exer-
cise of its religious beliefs. (Bob Jones, 1983. p. 604)
So diametrically opposed to public policy are racially discriminatory
practices. Catholic schools can lose tax-exempt status under Section 501
(c)(3), as well as the incentives provided by Section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code in allowing deductibility of gifts.
In addition to public policy, there is a long tradition of abhorrence and
condemnation of racism in any internal relationships within the Church. Pope
Paul VI, for example, in Octageslma Adveniens (1971) deplored all discrim-
ination on account of race, origin, color, culture, sex, or religion and urged
that all should be equal before the law. The U.S. Bishops reiterated the con-
demnation of racial discrimination in all respects in the pastoral letters of
1979 entitled Brothers and Sisters to Us (National Conference of Catholic
Bishops) and of 1986 entitled Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social
Teaching and the U.S. Economy (United States Catholic Conference).
AGE DISCRIMINATION
Age discrimination laws prohibit discrimination against all workers aged 40
years and older in any phase of employment. The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) was added to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1967 and is patterned after Title VII. When the ADEA was enacted in
1967, only workers between the ages of 40 and 65 were protected. In 1978,
the upper age limit was extended to 70. Effective January 1, 1987, the maxi-
mum age limit was removed altogether. The statute renders unlawful refusal
to hire, discharge, or other discriminatory acts against any individual with
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respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of age. The underlying restrictive practices were stereotypical per-
ceptions that older workers were unsuitable for employment.
Because the statute and its legislative history are silent about whether
religious organizations are within the definition of "employer," there is no
consensus in the federal courts as to the applicability of the Age
Discrimination Act to religious organizations.
In Cochran v. Saint Louis Preparatory Seminary (1989), the court held
the ADEA does not apply to a church-operated school because the applica-
tion of ADEA to the seminary would give rise to "serious constitutional ques-
tions" such as a state's entanglement with the religious mission of such insti-
tutions. The court expressed concern that the claim will implicate the involve-
ment of the EEOC in its investigatory and enforcement capacity. It would call
into question the employer's rationale as to whether the employment decision
was pretextual or made in good faith.
In Lakaszewski v. Nazareth Hospital (1991), the court rejected the defen-
dant's request for an exemption from ADEA. In Soriano v. Xavier University
Corporation (1988), the court held that enforcement of the age discrimination
law does not entangle nor endanger the religion clauses of the First
Amendment, especially in light of the relatively narrow focus of the ADEA.
More recently, the court in De Marco v. Holy Cross High School (1992)
stated that not only is the Act silent in reference to religious organizations, in
this case a Catholic high school, problems of enforcement, particularly where
discharge may have mixed religious and secular motives, bring the govem-
ment too closely into the internal decision making of the Church itself. In
Powell V. Stajford (\99A), a teacher of theology in a Catholic high school sued
to renew his employment alleging violation of the ADEA. The U.S. District
Court dismissed on First Amendment grounds. Here the court concluded that
the teacher was a ministerial employee because he taught theology in a reli-
gious high school.
Yet other courts have found no Eirst Amendment violations. In Gallo v.
Salesian Society, Inc. (1996), an age discrimination suit against a parochial
high school was held as not violating the Free Exercise or Establishment
Clause protections of the school. The case involved an English teacher. Since
there was no evidence offered of the religious content of the course in
English, the court denied that her position was ministerial. Thus, no inquiry
into faith, morals, or religious polity was required to resolve the issue of sex
and age discrimination. In Sacred Heart School Board v. Labor &. Industry
Review Committee (1990), a lay teacher brought an age discrimination claim
after discharge from a Catholic parochial school. The state agency claimed
the religious reasons were pretextual. The court agreed and held that the
agency investigation could go forward. See also Geary v. Visitation of the
Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School (1993).
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DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 is the most significant
disability legislation passed in American history. It prohibits disability-based
discrimination in application procedures, hiring, advancement or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, or other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment. The ADA is intended to eliminate employment
decisions based upon subjective perceptions, irrational fears, patronizing atti-
tudes, or stereotypes. It is far more comprehensive than a "hire the handi-
capped" law (Bassett. 1997). In effect, the ADA gives to the disabled equal
opportunity protections similar to those provided by the Civil Rights Acts
prohibitions against discrimination based on race, sex, and religion. Note that
the ADA does not require preferential treatment or require employers to
recruit persons with disabilities. The Act specifically envisions case-by-case
judicial review of general standards by the use of objective criteria.
For churches and religious organizations as employers, the ADA presents
.serious compliance challenges and possible legal claims for discrimination.
The Catholic school is then prohibited as an employer from discriminating
against "a qualified individual with a disability" because of that disability. A
school may be guilty of discrimination not only if it intentionally discrimi-
nates against the disabled, but also if it refuses to make a reasonable accom-
modation for an otherwise qualified individual.
The Supreme Court decided three cases on June 22, 1999, that clarify, at
least in part, what is required to state a disability claim under the ADA:
Sutton V. United Air Lines, Inc. {1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Services, Inc.
(1999), and Albertsons Inc., v. Kirkingburg (1999).
These cases focused on what plaintiffs must show in order to be consid-
ered "disabled" under the Act, or to show that an employer "regarded" them
as disabled. They do not refer directly to any other aspects under the ADA,
such as the notion of reasonable accommodation.
The ADA defines a disability as follows: I) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the
individual (examples of life activities include caring for oneself, walking,
seeing, talking, learning, performing manual tasks, and working); 2) a record
of such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having such an impairment
(Sec. 12102(2)).
While the EEOC provides guidance in its Technical Assistance Manual
(1991), Catholic educators should be aware that case law is gradually devel-
oping clearer standards for application of the ADA to accompany EEOC
guidelines. Catholic educators should nevertheless recognize certain statuto-
ry defenses to legal challenges alleging disability-based discrimination:
undue hardship of accommodation, direct threat to safety or health of others,
and religious entity preference.
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In Kent v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans
d/b/a St. Ann School (1991), the federal district court granted summary judg-
ment to the school on an ADA claim involving a parochial school teacher.
The teacher asked to be reinstated to her teaching position upon her return
from a leave of absence qualifying for disability benefits, but was informed
that there was no longer a position available, as the slot had been given to the
teacher who had replaced her during her absences. Her allegations of dis-
crimination under the ADA, though disputed by the school, were sufficient to
proceed to trial. Under the ADA, the plaintiff had to show: 1) that she suf-
fered from a disability, 2) that she was otherwise qualified for her job, 3) that
she was subject to an adverse employment action, and 4) that she was
replaced by a nondisabled person or treated less favorably than nondisabled
employees. The school offered nondiscriminatory reasons (unexcused
absences, poor teaching record, and the superior performance of her replace-
ment) to rebut the prima facie case, so the burden shifted to the teacher under
the ADA to prove that these reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination.
She was not able to offer material evidence to substantiate the pretext, so the
court upheld the grant of summary judgment to St. Ann's School and its prin-
cipal.
In Gosche v. Calvert High (1998), Gosche, a Catholic school music
teacher on leave for depression, had filed suit alle^j;ig discrimination against
her on the basis of sex and disability for the nonren'fewal of her contract. The
school had determined she had violated her conti-act to "reflect the values of
the Catholic Church...by word and example" (p. 871) when it was discovered
she was sexually involved with a married man, the father of three children in
the Catholic school. The court held that a religious school could make adher-
ence to the moral standards of the Church a requirement of continued
employment and so granted summary judgment for the Catholic high school.
In doing so, it avoided any prima facie analysis of the alleged ADA violation.
In other words, since the teacher was in breach of contract, any promise of
continued employment was extinguished and any pending ADA claims failed.
SEX OR GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in employment. It does permit a school
to consider an applicant's gender where sex is a bona fide occupational qual-
ification (BEOQ) reasonably related to the performance of the job. In prac-
tice, there is only a small range of jobs in which the BEOQ will be permitted,
as courts have imposed a very stringent evidentiary burden on organizations
seeking to impose gender restrictions. Catholic schools, for example, can
specify sex as a condition of employment only if the school has a tradition of
being single sex and only teachers of that sex have been hired (Shaughnessy,
1991).
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One interesting case regarding sex discrimination in a Catholic school is
Dolter V. Wahlert High School (1980), in which the district court rejected a
claim for a religious organization exemption under the separation of church
and state during a challenge involving wrongful termination based on sexual
discrimination. Here Dolter, an unmarried pregnant Catholic English teacher,
was discharged from a Catholic high school for engaging in premarital sex.
The court determined sex discrimination because the principal who rescind-
ed the teacher's contract had knowledge that male faculty members had
engaged in premarital sex but had not disciplined them. The court acknowl-
edged that Dolter's terminated contract would have been upheld if the
school's position on premarital sex had been fairly applied.
PROTECTIONS FROM SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment is a violation of Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. While not expressly mentioned in Title VII, it is implied in the
prohibition against sexual discrimination in working conditions. Courts were
initially reluctant to declare sexual harassment illegal for fear of a flood of
litigation. Since the mid-1970s both federal decisional law and the guidelines
of the EEOC proscribe such conduct. Note, sexual harassment claims under
Title VII have been applied to homosexual as well as heterosexual contexts.
See Joyner v. AAA Cooper Tran.sportation (1983) and Mogilefsky v. Superior
Court {\99?,).
The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin.sc)n (1986) recognized
two types of sexual harassment which are actionable under Title VII: 1) con-
ditioning employment benefits on sexual favors, and 2) creating a hostile or
offensive working environment. The essentials of the tort constituting viola-
tion of Section 703 are "unwelcome sexual conduct" and "condition of
employment." Employer liability occurs when the employer knew or should
have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take immediate and appro-
priate corrective action to stop it. The EEOC provides Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex (1980). A Catholic school has an affirmative
duty to eradicate hostile and offensive work environments. It should investi-
gate complaints immediately and thoroughly and take appropriate corrective
actions to stop the harassment.
There are no exemptions for churches and religious organizations for sex-
ual harassment. There have been a number of lawsuits against churches and
religious organizations for employer liability in sexual harassment situations.
In Nigrelii v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1995), a lay woman sued the
Archdiocese of Chicago, alleging that the pastor did not renew her contract
as principal of a parish school because she failed to acquiesce to the sexual
advances of the pastor. The Illinois court of appeals permitted the case to go
forward on the grounds that the allegation involved a question of fact and
credibility, not directly one of religious practice.
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In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the principle that for sexual harassment to be unlawful it must create an envi-
ronment that a "reasonable person" would find abusive. This standard pre-
vents hypersensitive employees from barraging schools and courts with com-
plaints.
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
Under the Taft-Hartley Act and its amendments, including the National Labor
Relations Act, employees are guaranteed the right to organize and to bargain
collectively with their employers. To implement the Act, Congress created the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), with general authority to supervise
the collective bargaining process. The jurisdiction of the NLRB is limited to
employees and enterprises involved in commerce. Though there was no direct
exemption of churches in the Act, the NLRB had not assumed jurisdiction
over employees of churches under what is called the "worthy cause" exemp-
tion (Laycock, 1981).
In the mid-1960s a nationwide initiative by the National Association of
Teachers and state teachers unions turned to organizing teachers in private
elementary and secondary schools. Church authorities in Chicago and Fort
Wayne, Indiana, strenuously resisted formation of bargaining units in
Catholic schools. The NLRB asserted jurisdiction over the religiously spon-
sored schools because the religious organization was not completely religious
but rather religiously associated. When Church leaders refused to recognize
the authority of local bargaining units, the Board filed unfair labor practices
suits in federal courts. These cases were consolidated in 1979 as National
Labor Relations Board v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, and went before
the Supreme Court on the issue of the Board's jurisdiction over employees of
parochial schools. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that assertion of
jurisdiction by the NLRB was impermissible, both because it was not intend-
ed by Congress and because such intimate involvement of the Board with
church-related schools would be fraught with problems under the Free
Exercise clause of the First Amendment. The Court rejected the Board's
claim that it could exercise jurisdiction in religious schools without entan-
glement in ecclesiastical affairs. Citing Lemon (1971), the Court noted the
important role played by teachers in shaping education in a church-operated
school.
The decision of the Supreme Court has been widely analyzed and criti-
cized. The principal point of concern is that the decision falls basically upon
the lack of clear intent of Congress, and more importantly, a real concern for
the churches' own role in fighting the teachers' unions while at the same time
professing to support the right to association of the faithful and the values of
unions in general. Since the decision, a number of religious organizations
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have been in federal courts to contest the jurisdiction of the NLRB over their
employees. Interestingly, in National Labor Relations Board v. Hanna Boys
Center (1992), a federal court held a bargaining unit of parochial school
cooks, cook's helpers, recreational assistants, maintenance workers, and child
care workers was found to be within the NLRB's jurisdiction because there
was no evidence that the employees were the functional equivalent of teach-
ers. But again, following NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago reasoning,
both National Labor Relations Board v. Bishop Ford Central Catholic High
School (1980/1981) and Christ the King Regional High School v. Culvert
(1987) resulted in the court denying NLRB jurisdiction.
At the state level, in South Jersey Catholic School Teachers Organization
V. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School (1997), the court
held that teachers have a state constitutional right to unionize and required
the Catholic Diocese of Camden to bargain collectively with lay elementary
school teachers. The court acknowledged that the state had proven a com-
pelling state interest in facilitating good faith collective bargaining, even
where there was a substantial burden placed on the free exercise of religion
by the pastors of the Diocese.
And in in re New York State Employment Relations Board v. Christ the
King Regional High School (1995), the Court of Appeals found that the
Board's order against the Catholic high school to bargain in good faith with
the Lay Faculty Association and to reinstate certain teachers was religiously
neutral and had as its goal the improvement of good faith collective bargain-
ing. Since the state law was not to burden religious beliefs or activities, the
Court found a minimal burden on free exercise by the State Board's intrusion
into the labor practices of a religious school. Also, citing Christ the King
Regional High School v. Culvert (1987), the Court found that the authority of
the Board over religious schools granted by the state legislature did not
involve the degree of surveillance necessary to fmd excessive entanglement
under the Establishment Clause. The Court found the Board had no authori-
ty to force the parties to agree to specific terms, only to require that they
negotiate in good faith.
Where a parochial school appealed an order compelling it to bargain col-
lectively with a union representing certain of its employees, a New York
appellate division court held, in New York Employment Relations Board v.
Christian Brothers Academy (1998), that because the order directed the
school to negotiate only on secular issues of rate, wage, and hours of
employment, the school's free exercise rights were not burdened, and no
excessive entanglement between church and state would result.
This development of case law is consistent with the provisions of Canon
law and church policy. In a 1978 statement of the Sacred Congregation for
Religious and Secular Institutes entitled Religious Life and Human
Promotion, it states:
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In principle there does not seem to be any intrinsic incompatibility between
religious life and social involvement even at the trade-union level. At times,
according to different laws, involvement in trade union activity might be a
necessary part of participation in the world of labor; on the other hand, such
involvement might be prompted by solidarity in the legitimate defense of
human rights, (p. 15)
Their principle is codified in the new Code of Canon Law (Canon Law
Society, 1983) which recognizes the religious employee's right of association
and rights to just compensation, participation, and social welfare.
When a labor-management dispute arises between Catholic schools and
its teachers or employees, by virtue of Catholic traditions of justice. Catholic
school personnel must be afforded a deeper spiritual commitment in recog-
nizing a basic right of association and autonomy in establishing and directing
organizations for their personal benefit. The Second Vatican Council in the
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (1966a) wrote:
Among the basic rights of the human person is to be numbered...the right of
freely founding unions for working people. These should be able truly to
represent themselves and to contribute to organizing economic life in the
right way. Included is the right of freely taking part in ihe activity of these
unions without risk of reprisal. (#68)
A FINAL THOUGHT
Historically, employment policies have been characterized by tension
between two often conflicting principles: free markets and freedom of action
on the one hand, and considerations of social justice and individual fairness
on the other. A standard value underlying our labor market today is fairness
through meritocracy: a person should be able to progress as far economical-
ly as his or her merit permits. Discrimination in the labor market on the basis
of race, gender, religion, age, or disability prevents individuals from advanc-
ing economically on the basis of their skills and ability.
While the above analysis of personnel and employment law is intended
to clarify existing statutes and case law affecting today's Catholic elementary
and secondary schools, it must always be remembered that law and public
policy are not static; they are subject to constant change and evolution.
Similarly, reasonable people differ regarding the point at which a balance
should be struck between the interests of workers and the legitimate concerns
of employers.
It is reassuring that most Catholic schools are aware of personnel issues
involving discrimination and harassment, and protecting faculty and staff and
guaranteeing school policy is applied equally to all. It is not common to see
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a Catholic school administrator abandon his or her sense of fairness and jus-
tice in the workplace.
But on the other hand, not all dismissal cases are as apparent as in
McGarry v. St. Anthony of Padua Roman Catholic Church (1998), in which
the court found that commission of a criminal act (ordering and receiving
drugs on church property) justified dismissal of the employee. Given the
unpredictable results in today's civil courts, one should consider having in
place a policy that permits final and binding ai'bitration when personnel dis-
putes arise. Just as commercial arbitration arose as a less expensive alterna-
tive to litigation, so employment arbitration can serve the Catholic school and
its mission well.
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